Meaningful Learning in Weighted Voting Games: An Experiment by Guerci, Eric et al.
Meaningful Learning in Weighted Voting Games: An
Experiment
Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Naoki Watanabe
To cite this version:
Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Naoki Watanabe. Meaningful Learning in Weighted Voting
Games: An Experiment. 2015. <halshs-01216244>
HAL Id: halshs-01216244
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01216244
Submitted on 15 Oct 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Meaningful learning in Weighted 
Voting gaMes: an experiMent
Documents de travail GREDEG 
GREDEG Working Papers Series
Eric Guerci
Nobuyuki Hanaki
Naoki Watanabe
GREDEG WP No. 2015-40
http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers.html
Les opinions exprimées dans la série des Documents de travail GREDEG sont celles des auteurs et ne reflèlent pas nécessairement celles de l’institution. 
Les documents n’ont pas été soumis à un rapport formel et sont donc inclus dans cette série pour obtenir des commentaires et encourager la discussion. 
Les droits sur les documents appartiennent aux auteurs. 
The views expressed in the GREDEG Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the institution. The Working 
Papers have not undergone formal review and approval. Such papers are included in this series to elicit feedback and to encourage debate. Copyright belongs 
to the author(s). 
Meaningful learning in weighted voting games:
An experiment
Eric Guerciy Nobuyuki Hanakiz Naoki Watanabex
GREDEG Working Paper No. 2015–40
Abstract
By employing binary committee choice problems, this paper investigates how varying or
eliminating feedback about payoffs affects: (1) subjects’ learning about the underlying rela-
tionship between their nominal voting weights and their expected payoffs in weighted voting
games; and (2) the transfer of acquired learning from one committee choice problem to a sim-
ilar but different problem. In the experiment, subjects choose to join one of two committees
(weighted voting games) and obtain a payoff stochastically determined by a voting theory. We
found that: (i) subjects learned to choose the committee that generates a higher expected payoff
even without feedback about the payoffs they received; and (ii) there was statistically significant
evidence of “meaningful learning” (transfer of learning) only for the treatment with no payoff-
related feedback. This finding calls for re-thinking existing models of learning to incorporate
some type of introspection.
JEL Classification Numbers : C79, C92, D72, D83
Keywords : learning, voting game, experiment, two-armed bandit problem
The authors thank Gabriele Esposito and Xiaoyan Lu for their collaboration in the early stage of this project, Yoichi
Izunaga for his excellent research assistance, and Yan Chen, John Duffy, Benjamin Hermalin, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, and
Roberto Weber for their valuable comments. We also acknowledge the contributions of the experimental economics
laboratory at Osaka University, in particular, Keigo Inukai, Emi Kurimune, and Shigehiro Serizawa for help in conducting
the experiment. We also thank Jeremy Mercer for proof-reading the manuscript. A part of this work has been carried
out while Hanaki was affiliated with Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics). Hanaki thanks the
Aix-Marseille School of Economics for the various support it provided. Financial support from MEXT Grants-in-Aid
24330078 and 25380222 (Watanabe), JSPS-ANR bilateral research grant “BECOA” (ANR-11-FRJA-0002), and Joint
Usage/Research Center of ISER at Osaka University are gratefully acknowledged.
yUniversite´ de Nice Sophia Antipolis (I.S.E.M.), CNRS GREDEG (UMR 7321). E-mail: eric.guerci@gredeg.cnrs.fr
zCorresponding author. GREDEG, Universite´ de Nice Sophia Antipolis, IUF, and Skema Business School. E-mail:
Nobuyuki.HANAKI@unice.fr. Postal address: GREDEG, 250 rue Albert Einstein, 06560, Valbonne, France.
xFaculty of Engineering, Information, and Systems. University of Tsukuba. E-mail: naoki50@sk.tsukuba.ac.jp
1
1 Introduction
For many years, experimental studies on learning in games have focused on describing the manner
in which subjects learn to play strategic games.1 Various models of learning have been proposed
to replicate and to understand the forces behind the observed dynamics of subjects’ behavior, such
as: reinforcement learning (e.g., Erev and Roth, 1998), belief-based learning (e.g., Cheung and
Friedman, 1997), and experience weighted attraction learning or EWA (Camerer and Ho, 1999).
However, Arifovic et al. (2006) show that these models of learning fail to replicate human behavior
as it has been observed in games such as a repeated Battle of the Sexes games. Erev et al. (2010)
also report that standard learning models based on the evolution of attraction do not perform well in
predicting how people behave in market entry games.
Researchers continue to propose new models that better capture observed human behavior. For
example, Marchiori andWarglien (2008) incorporate “regret” in their neural network-based learning
model, and show that it better replicates observed human behavior than either the EWA or neural
network-based learning models without regret; Hanaki et al. (2005) and Ioannou and Romero (2014)
extend the reinforcement and the EWA learning models, respectively, to allow players to learn which
repeated-game strategies to use in repeated games; Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) report that their
“individual evolutionary learning” model captures most of the stylized results in Public Goods game
experiments; and Spiliopoulos (2012, 2013) embed abilities to recognize an opponent’s behavioral
patterns in a belief-learning model in order to better capture the elicited subjective beliefs about the
opponent’s strategy in games with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
In contrast to the growing literature on learning how to play a game, few studies investigate
“cross-game learning” (Cooper and Kagel, 2003) or “transfer of learning” (Cooper and Kagel, 2008;
Haruvy and Stahl, 2009), i.e., whether subjects learn the underlying properties of the games they
play and whether they generalize what they have learned in one situation and apply it to similar but
different situations. In terms of the depth of learning, this higher-order concept of learning should be
distinguished from learning to make choices that generate better outcomes in a given situation; Rick
and Weber (2010) call it “meaningful learning” while Dufwenberg et al. (2010) call it “epiphany”.
The above-mentioned studies do not account for no-feedback learning with the exception of
Rick and Weber (2010), who study p-Beauty Contest games (Ho et al., 1998) and find that with-
1The objectives of this body of work differ from the work done on the theory of learning in games. See, e.g., Hart
(2005) and the references therein for the theoretical literature that mainly investigates the convergence properties of
learning models to various equilibria.
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holding feedback promotes meaningful learning in the sense that subjects learn to perform iterated
dominance.2 However, on the other hand, Neugebauer et al. (2009) report that subjects do not learn
to play the dominant strategy in a Voluntary Provision of Public Goods game if they do not re-
ceive feedback information. One of our aims in this paper is to study the effect that withholding
immediate payoff-related feedback has on this deeper learning in weighted voting games.3
Weighted voting, which gives a different number of votes to different voters, is a popular col-
lective decision-making system in many institutions such as stockholder voting in corporations or
voting blocs in multi-party legislatures. However, the relationship between nominal voting weight
and real voting power is often complex. In a study of the Council of Ministers in the European
Economic Community, Felsenthal and Machover (1998, pp.164-165) suggest that it must have been
difficult even for the policy makers and officials who designed and re-designed the system to see
through the underlying relationship between the nominal voting weights and the actual voting power.
To better understand the complex relationship inherent to weighted voting, researchers have
begun to conduct experimental studies to complement empirical analyses because many features
that are unobservable in actual practices can be controlled in experiments. Montero et al. (2008),
Aleskerov et al. (2009), Esposito et al. (2012), and Guerci et al. (2014) conduct experiments involv-
ing subjects deciding the allocation of a fixed amount of resources among themselves via weighted
voting. These experiments are all conducted in a cooperative game environment where extensive
forms are not specified for negotiations among the subjects.4 These studies find that an experimen-
tal measure of “a posteriori” voting power, which is defined as the average payoff a voter obtains
during the experiment, differs dramatically from theoretical measures of “a priori” voting power, as
2Rick and Weber (2010) also find that asking subjects to explain the reason for their behavior promotes meaningful
learning in the presence of feedback information.
3Other studies mentioned above do not consider the effect of payoff-related feedback on meaningful learning. Cooper
and Kagel (2003, 2008) deal with signaling games and find that letting subjects play in a team promotes “meaningful
learning” or what they call “transfer of learning”. Haruvy and Stahl (2009, 2012) combine rule-based learning (Stahl,
1996) and EWA learning models and show that in laboratory experiments of a sequence of 44 symmetric normal
form games which are dominance solvable, a learning model that re-labels the actions based on the steps of eliminating
dominated strategies (which assumes that agents understand the basic property – dominance solvability – of the game)
better captures subjects’ observed behavior. Dufwenberg et al. (2010) investigate it in two Race to X games (which
Dufwenberg et al. call “games of X”). In a Race to X game, two players alternately put 1 to M coins in one initially
empty hat. The game ends when there areX coins in the hat, and the player who has put theX-th coin into the hat is the
winner. BothM andX are common knowledge, and the number of coins in the hat is observable at any time. This game
has a dominant strategy and it can be solved by backward induction. Dufwenberg et al. (2010) show that whenM is 2,
subjects who had experience playing Race to 6 before they played Race to 21 are able to play the latter game perfectly
by using the dominant strategy more often than those who had experience playing Race to 21 before Race to 6. One can
infer that it is easier for subjects to adopt the dominant strategy for this class of games when X is smaller and that once
they have adopted the dominant strategy, they will exploit it every time they face the same class of games.
4Fre´chette et al. (2005a,b), Drouvelis et al. (2010), and Kagel et al. (2010) conduct experiments in non-cooperative
game environments that are variants of a legislative bargaining model.
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can be seen in Banzhaf (1965), Shapley and Shubik (1954), and Deegan and Packel (1978). These
remarkable discrepancies between theoretical predictions and experimental observations call for
a better behavioral theory of weighted voting games including how and what subjects learn while
playing these games. Of particular interest is the question of how subjects learn about the underlying
relationship between their nominal voting weights and their actual expected payoffs.
In this paper, we take a step toward answering this question by focusing on subjects learning
about the relationship between their nominal voting weights and their expected payoffs. In partic-
ular, by employing binary committee choice problems, we investigate how varying the feedback
information about resulting payoffs affects: (1) how subjects learn the underlying relationship be-
tween their nominal voting weights and their actual expected payoffs; and (2) how subjects transfer
what they have learned from their limited experience in one committee choice problem to another
committee choice problem. Each session of the experiment is comprised of a series of periods where
each subject must choose to join one of two committees (weighted voting games). Both committees
consist of four voters: the subject and three fictitious voters. The payoffs that a subject receives
after having chosen a committee are based on a theory of voting power proposed by Deegan and
Packel (1978). Subjects are not informed that payoffs are generated based on this precise theory,
but instead are told that a theory of decision making in committees determines their payoffs. After
experiencing one choice committee problem, subjects then face another one.
Why do we employ binary choice problems instead of letting subjects play weighted voting
games? The main reason is that, as Esposito et al. (2012) show, it is too difficult to detect what in-
experienced subjects learn while actually playing a weighted voting game with other inexperienced
subjects. Because the resulting outcomes of negotiations vary greatly from one round of game play
to another (see, e.g., Montero et al., 2008; Guerci et al., 2014), we consider such an experiment to
be too complex for inexperienced subjects to make deep inferences about the underlying relation-
ships between nominal voting weights and expected payoffs. Therefore, we drastically simplify the
experimental design by removing the issue of simultaneous learning among subjects. Because the
method for generating payoffs in our binary committee choice problems remains the same through-
out the experiment, our subjects have a better chance to learn about the hidden payoff mechanism,
i.e., the underlying relationship between their nominal voting weights and their actual expected
payoffs. We believe this is the most favorable environment for subjects to learn.
Because of our focus on the effect of varying payoff-related feedback on learning, we use three
treatments with three different levels of feedback to subjects in the experiment: no-feedback, partial-
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feedback, and full-feedback. In the no-feedback treatment, subjects are given no information about
the payoffs they obtain after each choice. The only information available to them in making their
choices is the description of how the votes are divided among the four players in the two committees.
In the partial-feedback treatment, after each choice subjects are given information about their own
payoffs but not the payoffs of the other fictitious members of the committee they chose. In the
full-feedback treatment, after each choice, subjects are given information about their own payoffs
and the payoffs for all the fictitious members of the committee they chose. Note that in both the
partial- and the full-feedback treatments, subjects do not receive any information about payoffs for
the committee they did not choose. This matches the feedback information given in a standard
Two-Armed Bandit problem.5
Our findings are as follows: (1) the percentage of subjects who chose the weighted voting game
that generated the higher expected payoff increased even without any feedback information on what
payoffs they received; and (2) there was statistically significant evidence of meaningful learning (or
transfer of learning) only for the treatment with no payoff-related feedback.
Standard models of learning based on the evolution of attraction (e.g., reinforcement learning
and EWA learning models) cannot be used to make any predictions about how subjects learn to
choose the option with a higher expected payoff in a no-feedback treatment. In fact, we are not
aware of any learning models that allow us to study learning with no explicit feedback information.
Nevertheless, we observed that the percentage of subjects who chose the option with the higher
expected payoff increased even with no feedback information. Further, we found statistically sig-
nificant evidence of meaningful learning between the two committee problems in the no-feedback
treatment, but not in the partial-feedback or full-feedback treatments. This finding calls for re-
thinking existing models of learning to incorporate some type of introspection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the design of the experiment;
Section 3 presents a detailed discussion of the results of the experiment; and Section 4 concludes
the paper.
5The standard Two-Armed Bandit problem does not provide subjects with any contextual information related to their
payoffs. See Meyer and Shi (1995), Banks et al. (1997), and Hu et al. (2013).
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2 Experimental design
2.1 The outline
Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g be the set of players (voters). The players decide an allocation of a fixed
amount of total points via weighted voting. A four-player weighted voting game is represented
by [q; v1; v2; v3; v4], where q is the quota (the minimal number of votes required for an allocation
to be adopted) and vi is the voting weight (the number of votes) allocated to player i 2 N . A
non-empty subset S of N is called a coalition. And a coalition is called a winning coalition ifP
i2S vi  q; otherwise, it is called a losing coalition. A minimum winning coalition (MWC) is a
winning coalition such that deviation by any member of the coalition turns its status from winning
to losing. In what follows, we generally call a four-player weighted voting game simply a game (a
committee), unless this produces potential confusion.
The experiment consists of various sessions, each consisting of 60 periods. In each period, the
subject is asked to choose to join one of two four-member committees that will divide 120 points
among the members. Both committees have the same total number of votes, the same quota, and
the same number of votes for the subject who will always act as Player 1. For instance, in one
session, a subject faces a binary choice problem between [14; 5; 3; 7; 7] and [14; 5; 4; 6; 7] for the
first 40 periods, while in the following 20 periods, the subject faces another binary choice problem
between [6; 1; 2; 3; 4] and [6; 1; 1; 4; 4]. Notice that in the first problem, the subject will have 5 votes
regardless of his or her committee choice. Similarly, in the second problem, the subject will have 1
vote regardless of his or her committee choice. What differs between the two committees is the way
votes are divided among remaining three members.
Before the start of each session, subjects are clearly informed that the other three members of the
committees are all fictitious. Thus, the experiment is regarded as a Two-Armed Bandit experiment
with contextual information on voting situations that is related to the possible payoffs for subjects.
We are interested in: (1) whether subjects learn to choose the option with a higher expected payoff
(henceforth, the “better” option) and if they do so in the first 40 periods; and (2) whether subjects
facing a binary choice problem choose the better option more frequently when they have already
had experience with a similar binary choice problem compared to subjects facing the same problem
with no previous experience.
As previously noted, in this experiment subjects are not asked to play weighted voting games.
This is to avoid the complexities that arise from several inexperienced subjects simultaneously learn-
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ing to play a weighted voting game from interfering with the same inexperienced subjects learning
about the underlying relationship between their nominal voting weights and their expected payoffs.6
Thus, the payoff a subject obtains from his or her committee choice is determined by an external
mechanism based on the theory of voting power proposed by Deegan and Packel (1978) called the
DPI.
The DPI is based on the following assumptions: (1) every winning coalition is a minimum win-
ning coalition (MWC), meaning it will fail if one member deviates; (2) all MWCs are equally likely
to be formed; and (3) within each MWC, the total payoff is divided equally among its members.
In the experiment, for each period, one MWC is chosen randomly among all the possible MWCs
for the committee the subject has chosen. If the subject is a member of the chosen MWC, he or
she receives an equal share of the total payoff (120 points) as the MWC’s other members. We have
chosen DPI over other well-known theories of voting power, e.g., the BzI and the SSI proposed
respectively by Banzhaf (1965) and Shapley and Shubik (1966) for its simplicity.7
Instead of referring to the committee members’ numbers, e.g., Player 1, Player 2, etc., hereafter
we describe MWCs in terms of the votes apportioned to members of the MWC. Using this notation,
the MWCs in [14; 5; 3; 7; 7] are written as (5; 3; 7), (5; 3; 7), and (7; 7).8 According to the DPI’s
mechanisms, in each period Player 1 (the subject) has 2/3 chance of being on the MWC and will
receive 40 points for being on an MWC (1/3 of 120 points), while there is a 1/3 probability that
Player 1 won’t be on an MWC and will receive nothing. We did not explain this underlying payoff
mechanism to our subjects; they were simply told that payoffs were determined based on a theory
of decision-making in committees.9
The binary committee choice problems we examine are shown in Table 1. In each committee,
the number of votes given to Player 1 (the subject) is indicated in bold. Note that in terms of both
expected payoffs and the set of all possible payoffs, Problems A and C are identical, and Problems
B and D are identical. During the experiments, subjects faced one of the following sequences of
binary committee choice problems (the order of problems subjects faced is indicated by the arrows):
A ! B, B ! A, C ! D, or D ! C, where the first problem is examined in the first 40 periods,
6In Esposito et al. (2012), subjects were asked to divide the fixed amount of total points in a subsequent negotiation
stage, but the authors were unable to identify clear determinants of how their subjects chose committees. Cason and
Friedman (1997) point to a similar complication in their market experiments, and conducted experimental sessions in
which subjects interacted with “robots” that follow the equilibrium strategy.
7It would be an interesting future study to consider subjects’ learning about the relationship between their nominal
voting weights and their expected payoff when the relationship is governed by the idea behind either BzI or SSI.
8These are written as f1,2,3g, f1,3,4g, and f3,4g in the formal notation of coalitions with references to the specific
players.
9See the Appendix for an English translation of the instructions.
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Problem Choice 1 (Expected payoff) Choice 2 (Expected payoff)
A [14;5; 3; 7; 7] (120  2/9) [14;5; 4; 6; 7] (120  1/4)
B [6;1; 2; 3; 4] (120  1/9) [6;1; 1; 4; 4] (120  2/9)
C [14;3; 5; 6; 8] (120  2/9) [14;3; 6; 6; 7] (120  1/4)
D [9;1; 3; 5; 6] (120  1/9) [9;1; 2; 6; 6] (120  2/9)
Table 1: The four binary committee choice problems we examine in the experiment. In each committee, subjects are all
assigned to Player 1, and the number of votes given to Player 1 is shown in bold. For all the problems listed here, Choice
2 generates a higher expected payoff for the subjects.
and the second problem is examined in the subsequent 20 periods.
2.2 Three feedback treatments
In this experiment, we apply three feedback treatments: (1) no-feedback, (2) partial-feedback, and
(3) full-feedback. In the no-feedback treatment, subjects are not informed of any payoffs they
receive as the result of their committee choice until the session ends. Thus, stimulus-response
learning models that are based on received payoffs cannot predict whether learning will take place.
In both partial-feedback and full-feedback treatments, the information on payoffs is shown only for
the committee the subject has chosen. These two feedback treatments differ in the content of the
information subjects receive. In the partial-feedback treatment, each subject is informed of his or
her own payoff in the committee he or she choses. This partial-feedback condition is similar to the
one used in the standard Two-Armed Bandit problem where subjects are only informed about the
payoff they received after each choice and in this feedback condition subjects can both observe that
the same choice generates varying payoffs and that the frequency of payoffs differs between the two
choices. In the full-feedback treatment, after each choice subjects are informed of the payoffs of
all four players in the committee they chose. Since in the full-feedback treatment, subjects observe
that (i) payoffs are equally allocated among a subset of committee members, and (ii) these subsets
of committee members change from period to period, we expect it to be much easier to learn about
the underlying relationship between payoffs and votes in this treatment compared to the other two
treatments.
In order to maintain a constant amount of time for subjects to think and make choices in all
three treatments, regardless of the amount of feedback information, we impose a 30-second time
limit for the choice stage and a 10-second limit for the feedback stage. If a subject does not choose a
committee within the 30 seconds of the choice stage, he or she obtains zero points for that period. In
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this case, regardless of the treatment, in the feedback stage the subject receives the special feedback
that he or she has obtained zero points for the period because they failed to make a choice within
the time limit. The rule that zero points are awarded in the case of no choice being made is clearly
explained in the written instructions. If a subject makes an early choice, say within the first 10
seconds of the choice stage, a waiting screen is shown until all the subjects in the session have made
their decision. If all the subjects make their choices before the end of the 30-second time limit, they
all enter the feedback stage. For the no-feedback treatment, during the 10-second feedback stage
subjects are shown a screen conveying the message “Please wait until the experiment continues.”
In the full-feedback and partial-feedback treatments, the relevant payoff information is displayed
during these 10 seconds.
2.3 The experimental procedure
The experiment is computerized and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In each session,
each subject is provided with written instructions upon arrival and then the experimenter reads a
copy of these instructions aloud. Subjects are allowed to ask questions regarding the instructions
and are given answers which all the subjects can hear. However, communication between subjects
is prohibited. After this, all information available to the subjects is provided via their computer
screens.
We follow other bandit experiments (e.g., Meyer and Shi, 1995; Hu et al., 2013) for the payment
scheme. Before the experiment, each subject is told that in addition to the show-up fee of JPY1000,
he or she will receive payment according to the total points he or she obtains over all 60 periods at
a rate of 1 point = JPY 1. In this experiment, the payment is not based on the total points gained in
a randomly selected period; our investigation isn’t aimed at identifying whether subjects choose the
option that generates the highest possible payoff for each period, but rather at determining whether
subjects learn to choose the option with the higher expected payoff. An English translation of
instructions is provided in the Appendix.
The experiment was conducted at the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) ex-
perimental laboratory at Osaka University in Japan in June 2014 and the experimental laboratory
at the University of Tsukuba in Japan in November 2014. There were four sequences of binary
choice problems, as described in Subsection 2.1, and for each sequence there were three feedback
treatments, as described in Subsection 2.2, resulting in 12 experimental conditions. We conducted
one experimental session for each experimental condition at each location. Each session in Osaka
9
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Figure 1: Time series of the percentage of subjects who chose the “better” option. Black: no-feedback, Red: full-
feedback, Blue: partial-feedback.
involved 20 subjects and each session in Tsukuba involved 10 subjects for a total of 360 subjects.
Subjects were randomly assigned to a session at both locations. Each session lasted around 60 min-
utes including the time for administering the instructions and the post-experiment questionnaire.
Our subjects earned an average of JPY 2500 (about 18 USD in 2014.)
The subjects were undergraduate students recruited from across the campus in each location, but
students who were third- or fourth-year economics majors were excluded. No subject participated
twice in this experiment. Out of these 360 subjects, 54 failed to make a choice within the time limit
at least once during the 60 periods.
3 Results
3.1 Overview of the data
Figure 1 presents the time series of the percentage of subjects who chose the better option (i.e., the
committee that generates a higher expected payoff for subjects) in each of the four sequences of
binary choice problems we examined.10 The data are depicted in three colors representing the three
feedback treatments: black for no-feedback, red for full-feedback, and blue for partial-feedback.
10The data are available from the authors upon request.
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Pooled (90) No-fb(30) Partial-fb (30) Full-fb (30) P-value (2 test)
Problem A 67 20 25 22 0.330
Problem B 31 9 13 9 0.455
Problem C 60 19 22 19 0.638
Problem D 22 8 5 9 0.457
Table 2: Number of subjects who chose the better option in Period 1. For each feedback treatment in each binary
choice problem, there were a total of 30 subjects. The number of subjects who chose the better option in the pooled
data (Pooled) is the sum of those subjects from the no-feedback (No-fb), partial-feedback (Partial-fb), and full-feedback
(Full-fb) treatments.
The dotted vertical line in each panel stands between Period 40 and Period 41 to indicate that the
choice problems were different in the periods before and after the line. Table 2 presents the numbers
of subjects who chose the better option as well as p-values from 2 tests across the three feedback
treatments for each problem.
In Problem A and Problem C, 74% and 67% of our subjects chose the better option in Period
1, respectively. In Problem B and Problem D, only 34% and 24% of subjects did so in Period 1.
Here, we are pooling the data across all three feedback treatments because none of the subjects
had received any feedback information prior to Period 1. Furthermore, we do not reject the null
hypothesis that the percentage of subjects who chose the better option in Period 1 were equal across
all three feedback treatments in any of the four problems (p = 0:330, 0:455, 0:638, and 0:457 in
Problems A, B, C, and D, respectively, 2 test).11 Furthermore, the percentage of subjects who
chose the better option in Period 1 in Problems A and C, as well as in Problems B and D, are not
significantly different (p = 0:252 and 0:141, 2 test, respectively). On the other hand, they are
significantly different between Problems A or C and Problems B or D (p < 0:001 for all four pairs
of problems, A-B, A-D, C-B, and C-D). These results lead to the following observation:
Observation 1. For Period 1 of the experiment, it was easier for subjects to determine the better
option in Problems A and C than in Problems B and D.
According to our subjects’ responses to the questionnaires administered at the end of each ses-
sion, a possible explanation for this observation is that subjects quickly identified the crucial dif-
ference between the two options in Problem A ([14; 5; 3; 7; 7] vs. [14; 5; 4; 6; 7]) and Problem C
([14; 3; 5; 6; 8] vs. [14; 3; 6; 6; 7]). In each of these two problems, one option has two “large” voters
who can form a MWC on their own, whereas the other option does not. The subjects intuitively
11In our analyses, we employ 5% significance level in rejecting the null hypothesis unless otherwise stated.
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avoided choosing the option with two large voters and thus chose the better option as of Period 1.
As a result, the time series of the percentages of subjects who chose the better option are flat in the
first 40 periods (panels [a] and [c] in Figure 1). In Problem B ([6; 1; 2; 3; 4] vs. [6; 1; 1; 4; 4]) and
Problem D ([9; 1; 3; 5; 6] vs. [9; 1; 2; 6; 6]), there is no such clear difference between the two options
as there are two large voters who can form a MWC by themselves in both options. As a result,
subjects had to learn to choose the better option, either through trial and error or by introspection,
which can be inferred by the upward trends in the percentage of subjects who chose the better option
in the first 40 periods (panels [b] and [d] in Figure 1).
It should also be noted in Figure 1 that for each binary choice problem, the percentages of
subjects who chose the better option generate similar dynamics regardless of differences in the
three feedback treatments. Exceptions are the following cases: (1) from Period 41 to Period 60
in panel [b], the line for full-feedback treatment is clearly below the other two; (2) from Period
20 to Period 40 in panel [c], the line for partial-feedback treatment is clearly below the other two;
(3) from Period 5 to Period 15 in panel [d], the line for no-feedback treatment is below the other
two; and (4) from Period 41 to Period 60 in panel [d], the line for no-feedback treatment is clearly
above the other two. This last case is notable as it implies that subjects who received no immediate
payoff-related feedback after their choices learned to choose the better option more frequently than
those who received full or partial-feedback. In what follows, we further investigate learning within
and across binary choice problems.
3.2 Learning to choose the better option
To better understand how each subject changed his or her choices over time, we need to analyze the
time series of individual choices. Let FRik denote the relative frequency of periods in which subject
i chose the better option within the k-th block of 5 consecutive periods between 5(k  1)+ 1 to 5k.
For example, FRi2 is the number of times subject i chose the better option between Period 6 and
Period 10, divided by 5. The change in the relative frequencies that subject i chose the better option
between the l-th block and them-th block is defined as:
FRil;m = FR
i
l   FRim:
As noted in Subsection 2.3, 30 subjects (20 in Osaka, 10 in Tsukuba) participated in each experimen-
tal condition defined by both the feedback treatment and the sequence of binary choice problems.
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No-feedback p = 0:621 (SR)
Partial-feedback p = 0:961 (SR)
Full-feedback p = 0:938 (SR)
p = 0:392 (KW)
No-feedback p = 0:010 (SR)
Partial-feedback p = 0:053 (SR)
Full-feedback p = 0:047 (SR)
p = 0:151 (KW)
(c) Problem C (d) Problem D
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0DFR21
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CDF
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0DFR21
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CDF
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Partial-feedback p = 0:713 (SR)
Full-feedback p = 0:099 (SR)
p = 0:659 (KW)
No-feedback p = 0:134 (SR)
Partial-feedback p = 0:014 (SR)
Full-feedback p = 0:584 (SR)
p = 0:025 (KW)
Figure 2: Empirical cumulative distributions (CDF) of changes in relative frequencies of subject i who chose the better
option between the 2nd block and the 1st block, i.e., FR2;1. Black: no-feedback, Red: full-feedback, Blue: partial-
feedback. For each binary choice problem, the p-values for the within-treatment (one-tailed signed rank,SR) test and an
across-treatment (Kruskal-Wallis, KW) test are reported below the panel corresponding to the choice problem.
Thus we have 30 observations of FRil;m for each experimental condition.
12 In this subsection,
we focus on FR2;1 and FR8;1 in order to investigate whether different levels of payoff-related
feedback have different impacts on subjects’ learning over both the short run and the long run.
For each binary choice problem, Figures 2 and 3 show the empirical cumulative distribution
(CDFs) of FR2;1 and FR8;1, respectively. Three colors correspond to the three feedback treat-
ments: black is for no-feedback, red is for full-feedback, and blue is for partial-feedback. In each
choice problem, the p-value for the one-tailed signed-rank (SR) test for each feedback treatment
is reported below the panel corresponding to the choice problem, where the null hypothesis is
FR2;1  0 (FR8;1  0), and the alternative hypothesis isFR2;1 > 0 (FR8;1 > 0). Because
12Below we drop superscript i fromFRil;m and simply refer them to asFRl;m.
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(c) Problem C (d) Problem D
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No-feedback p = 0:283 (SR)
Partial-feedback p = 0:768 (SR)
Full-feedback p < 0:001 (SR)
p = 0:114 (KW)
No-feedback p < 0:001 (SR)
Partial-feedback p = 0:004 (SR)
Full-feedback p = 0:218 (SR)
p = 0:054 (KW)
Figure 3: CDFs of changes in relative frequencies of subject i who chose the better option between the 8th and the 1st
block, i.e., FR8;1. Black: no-feedback, Red: full-feedback, Blue: partial-feedback. For each binary choice problem,
the p-values for the within-treatment (one-tailed SR) test and an across-treatment (KW) test are reported below the panel
corresponding to the choice problem.
we expect experience to enhance learning to choose the better option, we run a one-tailed test. The
p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test for a multiple comparison is also reported for each choice
problem, where the null hypothesis is that the medians of FR2;1 (FR8;1) are equal across the
three feedback treatments.
For Problems A and C, FR2;1 and FR8;1 were not significantly greater than zero for most
of the feedback treatments except for FR8;1 in the full-feedback treatment for Problem C. The
absence of significant evidence of learning to choose the better option in Problems A and C is better
understood in light of Observation 1. In Problems A and C, the subjects determined the better option
as of Period 1 and they did not change their choices significantly in subsequent periods.
On the other hand, for Problem B, FR2;1 and FR8;1 were both significantly greater than
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zero for most of the feedback treatments except FR2;1 in the partial-feedback treatment. Further,
FR2;1 was not significantly different across the three feedback treatments (p = 0:151, KW test).
Thus, regardless of the feedback treatment, it seems that subjects learned to choose the better option
more frequently (even in the first 10 periods) in Problem B. Comparing panels [b] in Figures 2 and
3, we see that, overall, the distributions ofFR8;1 lie towards the right of those forFR2;1, which
implies that more subjects learned to choose the better option when they were given more time to
learn.
In the case of Problem D, while FR2;1 and FR8;1 were not significantly greater than zero
in the full-feedback treatment, they were both greater in the partial-feedback treatment. Our data
do not make clear the reason for the absence of significant evidence of learning in the full-feedback
treatment. In the no-feedback treatment, FR8;1, but not FR2;1, was significantly greater than
zero, thus more subjects learned to choose the better option when they were given more time to
learn.
Our observation for subjects’ learning can be summarized in the following way:
Observation 2. In Problem B and Problem D, subjects learn to choose the options with higher
expected payoffs even without any feedback information regarding their payoffs.
3.3 Meaningful learning (learning transfer)
In order to confirm “meaningful learning” in our data, we begin by comparing the percentage of
inexperienced subjects in Period 1 and experienced subjects in Period 41 who chose the better
option when they first encountered the same binary choice problem. Note that the experienced
subjects faced a similar but different choice problem for the first 40 periods. Recall that the subjects
faced one of the following sequences of binary choice problems in the order indicated by the arrows:
A ! B, B ! A, C ! D, or D ! C. Thus, for example, for Problem A we will compare
the choices made by inexperienced subjects in Period 1 with the choices made in Period 41 by
experienced subjects who faced Problem B for the first 40 periods.
Table 3 presents the numbers of inexperienced subjects in Period 1 and experienced subjects
in Period 41 who chose the better option for the three feedback treatments with the four binary
choice problems. There are 30 subjects for each experimental condition defined by the sequence
of problems and the feedback condition. The number of subjects who chose the better option in
the pooled data (Pooled) is the sum of the number of subjects counted for the no-feedback (No-
fb), partial-feedback (Partial-fb), and full-feedback (Full-fb) treatments. The p-value for the 2
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Problem A Pooled (90) No-fb(30) Partial-fb (30) Full-fb (30) P-value (2)
Period 1 67 20 25 22 0.330
Period 41 48 15 16 17 0.967
p-value (2) 0.003 0.190 0.012 0.176
Problem B Pooled (90) No-fb(30) Partial-fb (30) Full-fb (30) P-value (2)
Period 1 31 9 13 9 0.455
Period 41 39 21 8 10 0.001
p-value (2) 0.221 0.002 0.176 0.781
Problem C Pooled (90) No-fb(30) Partial-fb (30) Full-fb (30) P-value (2)
Period 1 60 19 22 19 0.638
Period 41 64 23 22 19 0.495
p-value (2) 0.519 0.260 1.000 1.000
Problem D Pooled (90) No-fb(30) Partial-fb (30) Full-fb (30) P-value (2)
Period 1 22 8 5 9 0.457
Period 41 52 21 16 15 0.244
p-value (2) <0.001 <0.001 0.003 0.114
Table 3: Number of subjects who chose the better option. For each feedback treatment in each binary choice problem,
there are a total of 30 subjects. The number of subjects who chose the better option in the pooled data (Pooled) is
the sum of the number of subjects counted for the no-feedback (No-fb), partial-feedback (Partial-fb), and full-feedback
(Full-fb) treatments. The p-values for 2 tests are reported for comparison across the three feedback treatments, and for
comparisons between Periods 1 and 41. The subjects were faced with one of the following sequences of binary choice
problems in the order indicated by arrows: A! B, B ! A, C ! D, orD ! C.
test is reported for all three feedback treatments and for the pooled data in each binary choice
problem, where the null hypothesis is that the percentage of inexperienced subjects in Period 1 and
experienced subjects in Period 41 who chose the better option are the same. The significantly more
experienced subjects have chosen the better options than inexperienced subjects for no-feedback
treatment in Problem B (p = 0:002) and for no-feedback and partial-feedback treatments in Problem
D (p < 0:001 and p = 0:003, respectively). In Problem A, however, the percentage of experienced
subjects who chose the better option was less than the percentage of inexperienced subjects for all
three feedback treatments, which was statistically significant in the pooled data as well as in the
partial-feedback treatment.
Thus, meaningful learning was observed for the no-feedback treatment in the sequence of Prob-
lem A to Problem B, as well as for the no-feedback and partial-feedback treatments for the sequence
of Problem C to Problem D. Can we, however, say that this is truly significant evidence of mean-
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ingful learning? Table 3 also reports, in the rightmost column, the results of 2 test (p-values) for
comparing the percentages across the three treatments. The null hypothesis here is that the percent-
ages of subjects who chose the better option are equal across the three feedback treatments. With
the exception of Period 41 in Problem B, there is no significant difference across the three feedback
treatments in Period 41. The p-values for the 2 test are 0.967, 0.001, 0.495, and 0.244 for Prob-
lems A, B, C, and D, respectively. Therefore, we need to further verify whether different feedback
treatments have different effects on subjects’ choices in the sequence of Problem C to Problem D.
For each experimental condition, we complement the above analysis by comparing the relative
frequency in which inexperienced subject i chose the better option within the first block of 5 con-
secutive periods (Periods 1 to 5), with the relative frequency in which experienced subject j chose
the better option within the ninth block of 5 consecutive periods (Periods 41 to 45).
Figure 4 displays the distributions of FR1 (inexperienced subjects) in black and FR9 (experi-
enced subjects) in gray for each feedback treatment in each binary choice problem. The p-value
for the Mann-Whitney U-test (MW test) is reported under each panel which corresponds to a feed-
back treatment for a binary choice problem, where the null hypothesis is FR1 = FR9. There were
significant differences between FR1 and FR9 only for the no-feedback treatment in Problems B
and D. (p = 0:049 and p < 0:001, respectively, MW test). We therefore discounted the case of
partial-feedback treatment in Problem D as providing significant evidence of meaningful learning.
Observation 3. Statistically significant evidence of meaningful learning was observed only for the
no-feedback treatment in Problem B and Problem D.
We found that withholding payoff-related feedback information stimulates meaningful learning
in weighted voting games in the sense that experienced subjects have chosen the better option more
frequently than inexperienced subjects when they faced the same problem. This is contrary to
our prior expectation that the full-feedback treatment would be the most conducive for meaningful
learning because subjects can observe how payoffs are equally distributed among the members
of varying MWCs after each choice. The positive effect of withholding feedback on meaningful
learning is, however, similar to what Rick andWeber (2010) found in the case of dominance solvable
games.
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(c) Problem C
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(d) Problem D
No-feedback Partial-feedback Full-feedback
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0FR
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CDF
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0FR
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CDF
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0FR
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CDF
p < 0:001 p = 0:264 p = 0:791
Figure 4: CDFs of FR1 (black) and FR9 (gray) for the three feedback treatments with four binary choice problems:
no-feedback (left), partial-feedback (middle), and full-feedback (right). FR1 is the relative frequency of periods in which
inexperienced subjects chose the better choice in the 1st block of 5 consecutive periods and FR9 is the relative frequency
of periods in which subjects with experience of another problem chose the better option in the 9th block of 5 consecutive
periods. The p-value for the Mann-Whitney U-test is reported for each feedback treatment in each binary choice problem.
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4 Conclusion
By employing binary committee choice problems, this paper investigated whether withholding or
varying feedback about the payoffs that resulted from subjects’ choices: (1) influenced subjects’
learning about the underlying relationship in weighted voting games between their nominal voting
weights and their expected payoffs; and, (2) influenced the transfer of what subjects learned in one
binary committee choice problem to a similar but different problem. To avoid possible complica-
tions emerging from inexperienced subjects simultaneously learning to play weighted voting games,
we drastically simplified the experimental design so that instead of letting subjects play weighted
voting games, we made subjects choose one of two committees (two weighted voting games) in a
binary committee choice problem. In our binary committee choice problems, the payoffs for sub-
jects after each choice were generated stochastically based on a theory proposed by Deegan and
Packel (1978). Subjects were told that the payoffs were mechanically generated based on a theory
of decision making in committees but were not given the details of the exact theory being used.
Our main findings are as follows: (1) subjects learned to choose the committee that generated
higher expected payoffs even without any immediate feedback information on the payoffs received
as a result of their choices; and (2) statistically significant evidence of meaningful learning was
observed only for the treatment with no payoff-related feedback information. Our findings support
the positive effect of withholding immediate payoff feedbacks in promoting “meaningful learning”
that Rick and Weber (2010) found in some dominance solvable games.
Well-known models of learning, such as the reinforcement learning, belief-based learning, or
EWA learning models, do not make any predictions about whether learning takes place when there
is no feedback related to payoffs. This is also the case for more recently proposed models of learning
such as “individual evolutionary learning.” Our finding calls for a new class of models of learning
that allow for learning based on introspection. Furthermore, when it comes to modeling “meaningful
learning,” it seems essential to create an explicit formalization of the process of introspection that
includes a means of assessing how varying feedback stimulates or hinders this type of learning.
Such theoretical developments will guide us in designing experiments to clarify issues such as for
which classes of games does withholding immediate payoff-related feedback stimulate subjects’
learning. We believe this to be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Appendix
Instructions
You will be asked to repeatedly make a simple choice between two options.
Imagine that you need to represent your interests within a voting committee. This committee
decides how to divide 120 points among its members. The committee has three other members, and
each member has a predetermined number of votes, which may be different from one to the other.
The committee will make a decision only when a proposal receives the pre-determined required
number of votes. You will be told what is the required number of votes. If more than one proposal is
put before the committee, the members cannot vote for multiple proposals by dividing their allocated
number of votes. A member can vote for only one proposal, and all of his/her votes must be cast for
that proposal.
You are asked to choose which of the two possible committees you prefer to join. You will be
informed of the number of votes allocated to each of the four members of the committee (including
you), and the number of votes required for a proposal to be approved. The number of votes you
have will always be indicated with the label YOU.
Full-feedback treatment
There is a total of 60 periods. In each period, you have 30 seconds to make your choice between
the two committees. If you do not make a choice within the 30 seconds in one period, you will
receive zero points for that period. When a choice is made, the chosen committee will automatically
allocate 120 points among the four members. The outcomes may vary from one period to another,
but are based on a theory of decision making in committees. Once the allocation is made, you
will immediately be shown the resulting allocation. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid
according to your total earnings during the 60 periods, at an exchange rate of 1 point = JPY1.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
No-feedback treatment
There is a total of 60 periods. In each period, you have 30 seconds to make your choice between
the two committees. If you do not make any choice within the 30 seconds in one period, you will
receive zero points for the period. When a choice is made, the chosen committee will automatically
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allocate 120 points between the four members. The outcomes may vary from one period to another,
but they are based on a theory of decision making in committees. You will not see the resulting
allocation after each period. However, at the end of the experiment, you will be told the total points
you have obtained during the 60 periods, and you will be paid according to the points earned over
the 60 periods at an exchange rate of 1 point = JPY1.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
Partial-feedback treatment
There is a total of 60 periods. In each period, you have 30 seconds to make your choice between
the two committees. If you do not make any choice within the 30 seconds in one period, you will
receive zero points for the period. When a choice is made, the chosen committee will automatically
allocate 120 points among the four members. The outcomes may vary from one period to another,
but they are based on a theory of decision making in committees. Once the allocation is made, you
will be shown the number of points allocated to you. You will not see the allocations to the other
members of the committee. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid according to your total
points score at an exchange rate of 1 point = JPY1.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
24
 Documents De travail GreDeG parus en 2015
GREDEG Working Papers Released in 2015
2015-01 Laetitia Chaix & Dominique Torre
  The Dual Role of Mobile Payment in Developing Countries
2015-02 Michaël Assous, Olivier Bruno & Muriel Dal-Pont Legrand
  The Law of Diminishing Elasticity of Demand in Harrod’s Trade Cycle (1936)
2015-03 Mohamed Arouri, Adel Ben Youssef & Cuong Nguyen
  Natural Disasters, Household Welfare and Resilience: Evidence from Rural Vietnam
2015-04 Sarah Guillou & Lionel Nesta
  Markup Heterogeneity, Export Status and the Establishment of the Euro
2015-05 Stefano Bianchini,  Jackie Krafft, Francesco Quatraro & Jacques Ravix
  Corporate Governance, Innovation and Firm Age: Insights and New Evidence
2015-06 Thomas Boyer-Kassem,  Sébastien Duchêne & Eric Guerci
  Testing Quantum-like Models of Judgment for Question Order Effects
2015-07 Christian Longhi & Sylvie Rochhia
  Long Tails in the Tourism Industry: Towards Knowledge Intensive Service Suppliers
2015-08 Michael Dietrich, Jackie Krafft & Jolian McHardy
  Real Firms, Transaction Costs and Firm Development: A Suggested Formalisation
2015-09 Ankinée Kirakozian
  Household Waste Recycling: Economics and Policy
2015-10 Frédéric Marty
  Régulation par contrat
2015-11 Muriel Dal-Pont Legrand & Sophie pommet
  Nature des sociétés de capital-investissement et performances des firmes : le cas de la France
2015-12 Alessandra Colombelli, Jackie Krafft & Francesco Quatraro
  Eco-Innovation and Firm Growth: Do Green Gazelles Run Faster? Microeconometric Evidence  
  from a Sample of European Firms
2015-13 Patrice Bougette & Christophe Charlier
  La difficile conciliation entre politique de concurrence et politique industrielle : le soutien aux  
  énergies renouvelables
2015-14 Lauren Larrouy
  Revisiting Methodological Individualism in Game Theory: The Contributions of Schelling 
  and Bacharach
2015-15 Richard Arena & Lauren Larrouy
  The Role of Psychology in Austrian Economics and Game Theory: Subjectivity and Coordination
2015-16 Nathalie Oriol & Iryna Veryzhenko
  Market Structure or Traders’ Behaviour? An Assessment of Flash Crash Phenomena and their  
  Regulation based on a Multi-agent Simulation
2015-17 Raffaele Miniaci & Michele Pezzoni
  Is Publication in the Hands of Outstanding Scientists? A Study on the Determinants of Editorial  
  Boards Membership in Economics
2015-18 Claire Baldin & Ludovic Ragni
  L’apport de Pellegrino Rossi à la théorie de l’offre et de la demande : une tentative    
  d’interprétation
 2015-19 Claire Baldin & Ludovic Ragni
  Théorie des élites parétienne et moment machiavélien comme principes explicatifs de la   
  dynamique sociale : les limites de la méthode des approximations successives
2015-20 Ankinée Kirakozian & Christophe Charlier
  Just Tell me What my Neighbors Do! Public Policies for Households Recycling
2015-21 Nathalie Oriol, Alexandra Rufini & Dominique Torre
  Should Dark Pools be Banned from Regulated Exchanges?
2015-22 Lise Arena & Rani Dang
  Organizational Creativity versus Vested Interests: The Role of Academic Entrepreneurs in the  
  Emergence of Management Education at Oxbridge
2015-23 Muriel Dal-Pont Legrand & Harald Hagemann
  Can Recessions be ‘Productive’? Schumpeter and the Moderns
2015-24 Alexandru Monahov
  The Effects of Prudential Supervision on Bank Resiliency and Profits in a Multi-Agent Setting 
2015-25 Benjamin Montmartin
  When Geography Matters for Growth: Market Inefficiencies and Public Policy Implications 
2015-26 Benjamin Montmartin, Marcos Herrera & Nadine Massard
  R&D Policies in France: New Evidence from a NUTS3 Spatial Analysis 
2015-27 Sébastien Duchêne, Thomas Boyer-Kassem & Eric Guerci
  Une nouvelle approche expérimentale pour tester les modèles quantiques de l’erreur de   
  conjonction 
2015-28 Christian Longhi
  Clusters and Collective Learning Networks: The Case of the Competitiveness Cluster ‘Secure   
  Communicating Solutions’ in the French Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Region
2015-29 Nobuyuki Hanaki, Eizo Akiyama, Yukihiko Funaki & Ryuichiro Ishikawa
  Diversity in Cognitive Ability Enlarges Mispricing
2015-30 Mauro Napoletano, Andrea Roventini & Jean-Luc Gaffard
  Time-Varying Fiscal Multipliers in an Agent-Based Model with Credit Rationing
2015-31 Thomas Jobert, Fatih Karanfil & Anna Tykhonenko
  Trade and Environment: Further Empirical Evidence from Heterogeneous Panels 
  Using Aggregate Data
2015-32 Bertrand Groslambert, Raphaël Chiappini & Olivier Bruno
   Bank Output Calculation in the Case of France: What Do New Methods Tell About 
  the Financial Intermediation Services in the Aftermath of the Crisis? 
2015-33 Mohamed Siry Bah & Thomas Jobert
   Une analyse empirique du processus de convergence des pays africains
2015-34 Takashi Yamada & Nobuyuki Hanaki
    An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games
2015-35 Dino Borie, Pierre Garrouste & Ismaël Rafaï
    Le temps et l’erreur comme mesures de la quantité d’attention : une approche expérimentale
2015-36 Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste
    Michael Polanyi’s Economics: A Strange Rapprochement
2015-37 Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste
    Wieser as a Theorist of Institutional Change
2015-38 Lauren Larrouy
    The Ontology of Schelling’s “Theory of Interdependent Decisions”
2015-39 Sandye Gloria-Palermo
    Menger contre Walras
2015-40 Eric Guerci, Nobuyuki Hanaki & Naoki Watanabe
   Meaningful Learning in Weighted Voting Games: An Experiment
